Appendix A : requirements compliance matrix A.1 purpose and/or scope

Due to the complexity and uniqueness of space flight, it is unlikely that all the requirements in a Standard will apply. The Requirements Identification Matrix below contains this Standard’s technical authority requirements and may be used by programs and projects to indicate requirements that are applicable or not applicable. Enter “Yes” in the “Applicable” column if the requirement is applicable to the program or project or “No” if the requirement is not applicable to the program or project. The “Comments” column may be used to provide specific instructions on how to apply the requirement, specify proposed tailoring, or provide an explanation/justification when not applicable.

A.2 REQUIREMENTS COMPLIANCE MATRIX TABLES

Table 2, General Requirements, contains the general requirements for an FCP, the responsible parties for fracture control, and the fracture control classification of all parts. Table 3, Exempt, contains the requirements for the exempt classification. Table 4, NFC Requirements, contains the requirements for the non-fracture critical classification. Table 5, Fracture Critical Requirements, contains the requirements for the fracture critical classification. Table 6, Flaw Screening, Evaluation, and Materials Requirements, contains the flaw screening, evaluation, traceability, and material selection requirements. Table 7, Documentation and Verification, contains the requirements for documentation and verification. Table 8, Alternate Approach Requirement, presents the requirement for alternate approaches.

Controlled by: NASA

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Table 2—General Requirements

| NASA-STD-5019A: Description=Overarching fracture control requirement, Section=4.1, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 1] A Fracture Control Plan shall be developed and maintained by the program for human-rated spaceflight hardware that satisfies all of the following: a. Addresses all of the parts in the program-specific flight hardware. b. Meets the requirements of this NASA Technical Standard. c. Specifies fracture controls that are established to mitigate the risk of catastrophic failure caused by flaws throughout the service life of the hardware d. Has approval by the RFCB. | NASA-STD-5019A: Description=NASA’s implementation of fracture control on human-rated spaceflight hardware, Section=4.2.1, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 2] The NASA Center responsible for the human-rated spaceflight hardware shall establish and designate a NASA RFCB to ensure compliance with the technical requirements of this document. | NASA-STD-5019A: Description=NASA’s implementation of fracture control on human-rated spaceflight hardware, Section=4.2.2, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 3] Human-rated spaceflight programs shall impose fracture control on their projects to meet the requirements of this NASA Technical Standard. | NASA-STD-5019A: Description=NASA’s implementation of fracture control on human-rated spaceflight hardware, Section=4.2.3, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 4] Fracture control implementation shall be performed with the oversight, advice, and approval of the RFCB. | NASA-STD-5019A: Description=Evaluation of all parts, Section=4.3, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 5] All parts used in human-rated spaceflight hardware shall be evaluated to identify the following: a. The fracture control classification of each part as either exempt, NFC, or fracture critical. b. The corresponding approaches that follow the requirements of this NASA Technical Standard to be documented in the FCP.

Controlled by: NASA Table 4—NFC Requirements NASA-STD-5019A Description Section Requirement in this Standard Applicable (Yes or No) If No, Enter Rationale Non-Fracture Critical Classification 6.1 [FCR 7] To be classified as NFC, each part that is described by a specific hardware type in the following list shall comply with the established approach given in the referenced subsection:
a. NFC metallic fasteners, rivets, shear pins, and locking devices comply with section 6.1.1 in this NASA Technical Standard. b. NFC shatterable components and structures comply with section 6.1.2 in this NASA Technical Standard. c. NFC rotating hardware complies with section 6.1.3 in this NASA Technical Standard. d. NFC sealed containers comply with section 6.1.4 in this NASA Technical Standard. e. NFC tools, mechanisms, and tethers comply with section 6.1.5 in this NASA Technical Standard.
f. NFC batteries comply with section 6.1.6 in this NASA Technical Standard.

6.2 [FCR 8] Each part classified as NFC that is not of a specific hardware type as described in section 6.1 in this NASA Technical Standard shall comply with one of the following items:
a. NFC low-released mass complies with section 6.2.1 in this NASA Technical Standard. b. NFC contained complies with section 6.2.2 in this NASA Technical Standard.

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| NASA-STD-5019A: Requirement in this Standard=c. NFC fail-safe complies with section 6.2.3 in this NASA Technical Standard. d. NFC NHLBB pressurized components comply with section 6.2.4 in this NASA Technical Standard. e. NFC low-risk part complies with section 6.2.5 in this NASA Technical Standard. f. NFC documented non- hazardous failure mode complies with section 6.2.6 in this NASA Technical Standard. | NASA-STD-5019A: Section=6.3, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 9] NFC composite or bonded parts that satisfy requirements for classification in a specific category in sections 6.1 and 6.2 in this NASA Technical Standard shall also comply with all of the following items: a. For parts classified as NFC low risk, develop the following: (1) A DTA in accordance with section 7.4.1 in this NASA Technical Standard. (2) An IDMP in accordance with section 7.4.2 in this NASA Technical Standard. (3) An RTD in accordance with section 7.4.3 in this NASA Technical Standard. b. For NFC parts not classified as low risk, perform the following: (1) Define and quantify the flaws from any source that may occur to the hardware during its service life, considering all applicable flaw detection and mitigation strategies that

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| NASA-STD-5019A: Requirement in this Standard=are implemented for the flight hardware. (2) Develop an IDMP in accordance with section 7.4.2 of this NASA Technical Standard. c. Perform NDE after completion of all manufacturing processes (or (or after proof test, if a proof test is performed) in accordance with section 8.1.2 in this NASA Technical Standard, with the following clarifications: (1) No NDE is required for NFC low-released mass parts. (2) No NDE is required for NFC contained parts. d. Meet the traceability requirement of section 8.2 in this NASA Technical Standard [FCR 21]. e. Meet the material selection and usage requirement of section 8.3 in this NASA Technical Standard [FCR 22].

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Table 5—Fracture Critical Requirements

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Controlled by: NASA Table 5—Fracture Critical Requirements NASA-STD-5019A Description Section Requirement in this Standard Applicable (Yes or No) If No, Enter Rationale Fracture Critical Classification 7.1 [FCR 10] Parts shall be classified as fracture critical unless one of the following is met: a. There is no credible possibility for a flaw in the part to cause failure during the lifetime of the part. b. Part failure does not result in a credible catastrophic hazard.

7.2 [FCR 11] Each fracture critical part that is described by a specific hardware type in the following list shall comply with the established approach given in one of the following items: a. Fracture critical metallic pressure vessels comply with section 7.2.1 of this NASA Technical Standard. b. Fracture critical composite overwrapped pressure vessels (COPVs) and composite overwrapped pressurized fluid containers comply with section 7.2.2 in this NASA Technical Standard. c. Other fracture critical pressure vessels and pressurized fluid containers comply with section 7.2.3 in this NASA Technical Standard. d. Fracture critical lines, fittings, and other pressurized components comply with section 7.2.4 in this NASA Technical Standard. e. Fracture critical habitable structures and volumes comply with section 7.2.5 in this NASA Technical Standard. f. Fracture critical pressurized structures comply with section 7.2.6 in this NASA Technical Standard.

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| NASA-STD-5019A: Requirement in this Standard=g. Fracture critical rotating hardware complies with section 7.2.7 in this NASA Technical Standard. h. Fracture critical fasteners comply with section 7.2.8 in this NASA Technical Standard. i. Fracture critical shatterable components and structures comply with section 7.2.9 in this NASA Technical Standard. j. Fracture critical tools, mechanisms, and tethers comply with section 7.2.10 in this NASA Technical Standard. k. Fracture critical batteries comply with section 7.2.11 in this NASA Technical Standard. | NASA-STD-5019A: Section=7.3, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 12] Each fracture critical metallic part that is not of a specific hardware type as described in section 7.2 in this NASA Technical Standard and is not approved by the RFCB as appropriate for an optional approach as described in section 7.5 in this NASA Technical Standard shall comply with one of the following item combinations: a and b; a and c; or a, b, and c. a. Develop loading spectra by complying with section 7.3.1 in this NASA Technical Standard. b. Perform assessment by analysis to comply with section 7.3.2 in this NASA Technical Standard. c. Perform assessment by test to comply with section 7.3.3 in this NASA Technical Standard.

| NASA-STD-5019A: Section=7.4, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 13] Each fracture critical composite or bonded part that is not of a specific hardware type as described in section 7.2 in this NASA Technical Standard and is not approved by the RFCB as appropriate for an optional approach as described in section 7.5 in this NASA Technical Standard shall comply with all of the following items: a. Develop a DTA by complying with section 7.4.1 in this NASA Technical Standard. b. Develop an IDMP by complying with section 7.4.2 in this NASA Technical Standard. c. Develop an RTD by complying with section 7.4.3 in this NASA Technical Standard. d. Develop loading spectra by complying with section 7.4.4 in this NASA Technical Standard. e. Perform damage tolerance tests on coupons by complying with section 7.4.5 in this NASA Technical Standard. f. Perform damage tolerance tests of hardware elements by complying with section 7.4.6 in this NASA Technical Standard. g. Perform strength and life assessments by complying with section 7.4.7 in this NASA Technical Standard. h. Perform damage tolerance tests of full-scale flight-like hardware by complying with section 7.4.8 in this NASA Technical Standard. i. Evaluate anomalies discovered during any portion of the BBA by

| NASA-STD-5019A: Requirement in this Standard=complying with section 7.4.9 in this NASA Technical Standard. | NASA-STD-5019A: Section=7.5, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 14] Each fracture critical part that is not of a specific hardware type as described in section 7.2 in this NASA Technical Standard and is approved as appropriate for one of the following optional approaches by the RFCB shall comply with one of the following items: a. Single-event fracture critical components comply with section 7.5.1 in this NASA Technical Standard. b. HCF components comply with section 7.5.2 in this NASA Technical Standard. c. Proof test approach for composite or bonded hardware complies with section 7.5.3 in this NASA Technical Standard. d. Fleet leading testing approach complies with section 7.5.4 in this NASA Technical Standard. e. Hazardous fluid containers for payloads and experiments comply with section 7.5.5 in this NASA Technical Standard.

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Table 3—Exempt

. It outlines three categories for exempt parts: non-structural parts with no credible failure mode, non-structural parts with no catastrophic hazard potential, and other non-structural parts approved by the RFCB. This table is needed to determine if a part can be classified as exempt, answering the question of what constitutes an exempt part.]

| NASA-STD-5019A: Description=Exempt Classification, Section=5, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 6] Each part classified as exempt shall fit into one of the following categories: a. Non-structural parts with no credible failure mode caused by a flaw. b. Non-structural parts with no credible potential for causing a catastrophic hazard. c. Other non-structural parts approved by the RFCB for exempt status

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Table 4—NFC Requirements

Description Non-Fracture Critical Classification: Section=6.1, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 7] To be classified as NFC, each part that is described by a specific hardware type in the following list shall comply with the established approach given in the referenced subsection: a. NFC metallic fasteners, rivets, shear pins, and locking devices comply with section 6.1.1 in this NASA Technical Standard. b. NFC shatterable components and structures comply with section 6.1.2 in this NASA Technical Standard. c. NFC rotating hardware complies with section 6.1.3 in this NASA Technical Standard. d. NFC sealed containers comply with section 6.1.4 in this NASA Technical Standard. e. NFC tools, mechanisms, and tethers comply with section 6.1.5 in this NASA Technical Standard. f. NFC batteries comply with section 6.1.6 in this NASA Technical Standard., Applicable=(Yes or No), If No, Enter=Rationale Description Non-Fracture Critical Classification: Section=6.2, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 8] Each part classified as NFC that is not of a specific hardware type as described in section 6.1 in this NASA Technical Standard shall comply with one of the following items: a. NFC low-released mass complies with section 6.2.1 in this NASA Technical Standard. b. NFC contained complies with section 6.2.2 in this NASA Technical Standard.

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| NASA-STD-5019A: Requirement in this Standard=critical joints, discontinuities, and other critical locations identified in the FCP for all hardware, i.e., critical hardware locations not screened for specific flaws with the proof test. | NASA-STD-5019A: Section=8.1.3, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 18] If proof testing is used as the flaw screening technique for fracture critical parts, the approach shall be documented in the FCP with rationale establishing that it is an applicable approach that has been approved by the RFCB. | NASA-STD-5019A: Section=8.1.4, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 19] If process controls are used to establish bounds on flaw sizes in fracture critical parts, the approach shall be subject to the following: a. The approach is documented in the FCP. b. The rationale establishing that the approach is applicable is documented in the FCP. c. The FCP is approved by the RFCB. | NASA-STD-5019A: Section=8.1.5, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 20] Spaceflight hardware with detected flaws that is used for flight without being repaired or replaced shall have a specific detailed assessment approach documented with rationale in the FCP that contains the following: a. An assessment approach of metallic parts by analysis is to include the following items in addition to the items in section 7.3.2 in this NASA Technical Standard: (1) Upper bound flaw size. (2) Upper bound crack growth rate. (3) Lower bound critical stress intensity factor or residual strength.

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| NASA-STD-5019A: Requirement in this Standard=d. Design and assess with strength and damage tolerance properties that are generated by tests on samples representative of the flight hardware material, subject to either item (1) or (2) below: (1) Material is processed to the same thickness, material process condition, and material orientation in the part) that result in the worst combination for damage tolerant assessment. (2) The material process condition and the material orientation are fully traceable throughout fabrication and service life. e. Derived strength and damage tolerance data obtained from NASA- approved sources. If data are lacking, data are conservatively bounded or determined by sufficient testing to assess scatter to provide averages with testing approved by the RFCB. f. Obtain an approved MUA for any materials not developed and qualified in accordance with the requirements of NASA-STD-6016. g. Include all MUAs in the FCSR.

Controlled by: NASA

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Table 7—Documentation and Verification

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| NASA-STD-5019A: Requirement in this Standard=a. Written documentation that establishes that each requirement has been met. This documentation describes how the requirement was verified, e.g., test, analysis, inspection. The project is responsible for providing this verification, including assurance that fracture control activities were implemented on the flight hardware before flight and re-flight, to the appropriate program management. b. Approval of the FCP and FCSR by the RFCB, documented by a concurrence memorandum from the RFCB to the applicable project/program office. c. In the event of conflict between the RFCB and the applicable project office concerning verification of compliance with fracture control requirements, follow the procedures in place at each NASA Center to resolve technical conflict, with the option to appeal to the NASA Chief Engineer for final resolution.

Controlled by: NASA NASA-STD-5019A Description Section Requirement in this Standard Applicable (Yes or No) If No, Enter Rationale a. Written documentation that establishes that each requirement has been met. This documentation describes how the requirement was verified, e.g., test, analysis, inspection. The project is responsible for providing this verification, including assurance that fracture control activities were implemented on the flight hardware before flight and re-flight, to the appropriate program management. b. Approval of the FCP and FCSR by the RFCB, documented by a concurrence memorandum from the RFCB to the applicable project/program office. c. In the event of conflict between the RFCB and the applicable project office concerning verification of compliance with fracture control requirements, follow the procedures in place at each NASA Center to resolve technical conflict, with the option to appeal to the NASA Chief Engineer for final resolution.

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Table 8—Alternative Approach Requirement

| NASA-STD-5019A: Description=Alternative Approaches, Section=10, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 26] If alternative approaches are proposed (rather than meeting any part of the accepted approaches that are prescribed in sections 5, 6, 7, or 8 in this NASA Technical Standard, with the exclusions show below), the alternative approach shall include all of the following items: a. Provide an equivalent assurance of mitigating the risk of catastrophic failure from flaws during the service life of the hardware. b. Have the approval of the RFCB. c. Meet all the other applicable requirements in this NASA Technical Standard. d. FCRs 10, 15, 20, 21, and 22 (sections 7.1, 8, 8.15, 8.2, and 8.3, respectively, in this NASA Technical Standard) are excluded from alternative approach consideration. Note that FCR 26 pertains to sections 5, 6, 7, and 8 only; therefore, FCRs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 23, 24, and 25 are also excluded from alternative approach consideration.

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Table 6—Flaw Screening, Evaluation, and Materials Requirements

| NASA-STD-5019A: Description=Flaw screening and evaluation, traceability, and material requirements for fracture critical parts and other applicable components, Section=8, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 15] All fracture critical parts shall be screened for flaws with methods and techniques identified in the FCP. | NASA-STD-5019A: Description=Flaw screening and evaluation, traceability, and material requirements for fracture critical parts and other applicable components, Section=8.1.1, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 16] Metallic fracture critical parts screened with NDE shall have inspections performed in accordance with NASA-STD-5009 and include the following for flaw screening by NDE:  a. Apply sufficient flaw inspection methods to the flight hardware to screen flaws larger than or equal to the size and shape that are evaluated in the hardware damage tolerance assessment.  b. In addition to NDE for flaw screening of other regions of fracture critical parts, perform post-proof test NDE at critical welds and other critical locations identified in the FCP for all parts that are proof tested as a part of acceptance, i.e., critical hardware locations not screened for specific flaws with the proof test. | NASA-STD-5019A: Description=Flaw screening and evaluation, traceability, and material requirements for fracture critical parts and other applicable components, Section=8.1.2, Requirement in this Standard=[FCR 17] For composite or bonded materials, the hardware developer shall:  a. Provide the NDE methodology and rationale in the FCP.  b. Perform flaw screening by NDE on all composite or bonded part regions, except for the following: (1) No NDE is required for NFC low-released mass parts. (2) No NDE is required for NFC contained parts.  c. For hardware that is proof tested as part of acceptance, perform pre- proof and post-proof test NDE at

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